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Abstract 
Providing additional finance for adaptation is a key element of the emerging international 
climate change framework. This paper discusses how adaptation funding may be allocated 
among developing countries in a transparent, efficient and equitable way. We propose an 
approach based on three criteria: the climate change impact experienced in a country, a 
country’s adaptive (or social) capacity and its implementation capacity. Rough indicators are 
proposed for each of these three dimensions. Physical impact and adaptive capacity 
together determine a country’s vulnerability to climate change. It seems both efficient and 
fair that countries which are more vulnerable should have a stronger claim on adaptation 
resources. The third dimension, implementation capacity, introduces a measure of 
adaptation effectiveness. It makes sense to focus adaptation finance on countries with the 
capacity to use these resources efficiently.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Adaptation is a central part of the post-2012 climate change architecture. For least-
developed countries, which contribute little to climate change but are hardest hit by its 
consequences, the adaptation debate is arguably more relevant than the question of 
emissions targets.  
 
The returns from successful adaptation are substantial, but so is the scale of 
investment required. A recent World Bank estimate puts the funding requirements for 
adequate adaptation in developing countries at $75-100 billion a year (World Bank 
2009a). Estimates by UNDP (2007) are of a similar order of magnitude, while the 
UNFCCC (2008) expects adaptation costs of $27-67 billion a year in developing 
countries and $44 – 166 billion a year worldwide (an underestimate, according to 
Parry et al. 2009; see also Agrawala and Fankhauser 2008 and Fankhauser 2010). 
Fankhauser and Schmidt-Traub (2010) estimate that climate change will increase the 
cost of meeting the Millennium Development Goals in Africa from $70 billion a year 
to $100 billion a year over the next decade. 
 
It is widely agreed, and indeed enshrined in the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, that developing countries will need financial and technical assistance from 
developed countries to help them implement appropriate adaptation strategies.1 But 
the exact mechanisms through which this assistance is to be provided are still a matter 
of debate. 
 
At the risk of simplification, that debate ultimately comes down to two basic 
questions: how can additional adaptation finance be raised and who should receive the 
additional funds. The need for extra funding itself is no longer disputed.2 This paper is 
about the second question – how additional adaptation funds should be allocated.3 
 
The allocation question is complex and pits ethical considerations of entitlement and 
need against economic concerns like delivery and effectiveness. Overlaying them are 
institutional issues related to governance, accountability and the link to the prevailing 
development aid framework. Adaptation and development are closely intertwined 
(McGray et al. 2007, Klein and Persson 2008) and the coordination between the two 
financial flows is crucial. At the same time, adaptation finance has to be, and has to be 
proven to be, additional to existing development assistance. 
 
Given this complexity, and the potential magnitude of the flows involved, it is 
important that the allocation process is as transparent, efficient and equitable as 
possible. This in turn calls for a set of objective and empirically measurable 
                                                 
1
 Article 4.4 of the UNFCCC states that “developed country Parties …shall… assist the developing 
country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting 
costs of adaptation to those adverse effects”. 
2
 The Copenhagen Accord promises additional financial assistance of $30 billion up to 2012, rising to 
$100 billion a year by 2020. This is for both adaptation and mitigation. (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs 
/2009 /cop15/eng/l07.pdf) 
3
 The question of potential sources of adaptation finance is discussed by Harmeling et al. (2009) and 
Müller (2008).   
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benchmarks that can guide the allocation process. Allocation decisions will always be 
based on judgement, and are to some extent political, but objective data can help to 
put them on a better analytical footing.  
 
This paper argues that these benchmarks should be centred around the concept of 
vulnerability. It seems reasonable that countries (or populations groups within 
countries) that are more vulnerable to climate change should, all else equal, have a 
stronger claim on adaptation resources.  This is also the presumption of the UNFCCC, 
which emphasizes assistance to “particularly vulnerable” countries (see footnote 1 
above). 
 
The practical difficulty with a vulnerability-driven, indicator-based approach is that 
vulnerability is difficult to define and measure objectively. Typically, vulnerability to 
climate change is taken to be a function of physical impact and adaptive capacity, that 
is, the severity of change (which in turn is a function of exposure and sensitivity) and 
our ability to respond to it.4 Neither component is straightforward to quantify, and 
little is known about the complicated pathways that translate potential impacts into 
vulnerability.  
 
Vulnerability is also a dynamic concept and will evolve over time, as socio-economic 
characteristics change and climate change becomes more pronounced. As such 
vulnerability assessments must be iterative, have defined time periods and be 
reassessed under an allotted timeframe. 
 
Another difficulty is aggregation. Even if the various aspects of vulnerability can be 
identified and measured, they will have to be compared with each other. For example, 
should coastal flooding be a higher priority than the loss of agricultural output? And 
should the answer to this question depend on the relative income of farmers and 
coastal dwellers and/or their ability to protect themselves?  The process to answer 
these questions cannot be “mechanistic”, based on a formula. It will be deliberative 
and judgmental, but the judgments have to be based on objective data. 
 
Moreover, it is unlikely that vulnerability will be the only allocation criteria. The 
World Bank approach to the allocation of IDA resources, for example, complements 
measures of need with indicators of implementation capacity – that is, the ability to 
manage and use finance effectively. We argue that the capacity to implement is as 
important for adaptation as it is for development assistance. Adaptation funding will 
be scarce and has to be used effectively. 
 
A low implementation capacity should not disqualify a country from receiving 
support. Fragile states, which are characterized by weak institutions and low 
implementation capacity are amongst the most vulnerable countries to climate change. 
However, insufficient implementation capacity will point to the need for different 
implementation arrangements, for example, the replacement of budgetary support 
with externally controlled project management. 
 
This paper attempts to define a set of indicators that can guide the allocation of 
adaptation funding and meet the core criteria of transparency, efficiency and equity. 
                                                 
4
 Adaptive capacity is sometimes also referred to as social capacity (e.g., World Bank 2009b). 
 6 
They are grouped around the three notions of physical impact, adaptive capacity 
(which together determine vulnerability) and implementation capacity (which 
promotes adaptation effectiveness). There is nothing unique to this structure, and the 
proposed indicators cannot answer all the questions, whether practical or conceptual. 
But they provide a starting point on which further discussions may be based.  
 
The paper starts with a conceptual discussion and a review of earlier attempts to 
quantify and measure vulnerability (section 2). Sections 3 to 5 offer indicative 
benchmarks for the three concepts at the core of our indicator system: physical impact, 
adaptive capacity and implementation capacity. Section 6 discusses different methods 
of aggregation and section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Measuring vulnerability 
 
Although well established in other academic fields, the concept of vulnerability has 
only recently entered into the climatic change debate. Broadly defined, ‘climatic 
vulnerability’ refers to the degree to which a natural or social system is likely to 
experience damage or harm due as a result of climate change (Füssel 2007). The 
IPCC in its third Assessment Report (McCarthy et al. 2001) defines vulnerability as: 
 
“The degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse 
effects of climate, including climatic variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a 
function of the character, magnitude, and rate of climate variation to which a system 
is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity.” 
 
Climate change vulnerability can, therefore, be seen as a function of three elements: 
exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity (Figure 1).  Vulnerable systems are those 
that are highly exposed, sensitive to change and have limited ability to adapt.  
 
Figure 1    Vulnerability and its components  
 
 
 
Source: After Schröter (2004).  
Notes: (a) defined as stimuli impacting upon a system, represents the background climate 
conditions within a system and any changes in those conditions;  
(b) defined as the responsiveness of a system to climate influences, the degree to which 
outputs change in response to changes in climatic inputs;  
(c) defined as the ability of a system to transform itself, so to be better equipped to deal with 
the new external stimuli. 
 
Measuring vulnerability is not an exact science. Uncertainty about future climate 
change makes it difficult to determine physical impact with precision, particularly at 
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the regional level. Multiple future scenarios and complex causal relationships make 
translating these impact uncertainties into human vulnerability even less clear. 
 
There is nevertheless an emerging literature aiming to measure and assess 
vulnerability. Studies addressing vulnerability to climate change tend to have their 
origins in two different disciplines.  
 
The first strand of literature is climate impact studies. There is a large number of 
national and global climate studies that attempt to quantify the potential extent and 
scale of climate change impacts. They focus on the physical and sometimes economic 
implications of climate change as they relate to specific sectors of the economy such 
as agriculture, health and coastal zones. 
 
Projections of climate impacts have improved significantly over the last few years 
(Füssel 2008), but there are still substantial knowledge gaps, particularly when it 
comes to understanding the impact of adaptation (Agrawala and Fankhauser 2008).  
Another drawback of traditional impact studies is that they tend to ignore the human 
dimension required to translate impacts into human vulnerability.  
 
The second strand of literature, vulnerability studies, aims to address this point. 
Vulnerability studies have long been used to identify those population groups most 
likely to be negatively affected by drought and other natural hazards. However, 
framing climate change impacts within a context of vulnerability is a fairly new 
endeavor. Most recent work on social vulnerability has tended to focus on the local to 
regional scale where the processes which shape vulnerability are better understood, 
often using a case-study approach (Ibarrarán et al 2009; Eriksen and Kelly 2007). Far 
fewer studies have attempted to address vulnerability at a national level.5  
 
Most vulnerability studies do not specifically deal with the modelled impacts of 
climate change. Instead, they focus on the presence of environmental assets which 
may be affected by climatic changes, such as arable land or areas previously affected 
by climatic disasters (Brooke et al 2005; Lonergan 1999).   
 
A notable exception is Moss et al (2001), who developed the Vulnerability-Resilience 
Impact Model (VRIM). Using indicators of sensitivity to climate change and 
indicators of coping-adaptive capacity Moss et al (2001) calculated an aggregate 
indicator of vulnerability for three alternative future climate scenarios.  
 
Recent aggregated indices have combined measures of climate change severity with 
measures of socioeconomic capacity. However none of these have considered 
projections from climate impact models. Projected data such as precipitation and 
temperature are used to proxy the severity of regional climate change instead.6   
 
 
3. Indicators of impact 
 
                                                 
5
 For examples of such social vulnerability studies see Brooks et al (2005) and Esty et al (2005). 
6
 See Baettig et al. (2007); Diffenbaugh et al (2007) and Yohe et al (2006). For a further discussion of 
vulnerability indices see Füssel (2009) and Eriksen and Kelly (2007). 
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Exposure to, and sensitivity towards climatic change together decide the strength of 
an impact on a country or locality (see Figure 1 above). Since exposure and sensitivity 
are difficult to disentangle, we use their combined effect, physical impact, as the first 
pillar of our indicator system. 
 
Ideally, an indicator of physical impact should include all aspects of climate change 
and cover all the main sectors. However, that level of information is not available, 
even if the effects of climate change are increasingly well understood (see Parry et al. 
2007). The main constraint is the availability of internally consistent, global data, 
which are crucial to establish credible vulnerability scores at the global level. Making 
cross-country comparisons based on national-level studies would be difficult, given 
the high diversity in underlying assumptions and study methods.  
 
There are much fewer global studies and they are inevitably less accurate than 
detailed local case studies. However, the main concern here is relative vulnerability 
across countries, rather than the absolute vulnerability of a particular place. The 
assumption is that country rankings may be relatively robust and not sensitive to the 
analytical shortcomings of global studies.  
 
Suitable global studies are available for agriculture, health and coastal protection. In   
the case of extreme events, we use historic disaster statistics as a proxy for future 
vulnerability. Table 1 gives the details. The table shows that the impact metrics and 
climate assumptions differ widely across the four sectors. However, our main concern 
is consistency within a sector, rather than comparison across sectors. Future research 
may tell us more on how country rankings change as a function of different climate 
scenarios. The assumption here is that rankings are robust in this respect. 
 
Table 1    Indicators of physical impact 
Indicator Metric Source Assumptions 
Agriculture Inverse percent crop 
yield change (wheat, 
rice, soybean) by 2050 
Parry et al, 
(2004) 
Yield change is representative of 
impact on producers and 
consumers.   
Disasters Percent population 
killed by disasters 
EMDAT disaster 
database 1990-
1999 
Current disaster patterns 
representative of future impacts 
from climate change 
Health Percent additional 
deaths in 2050  
Bosello et al, 
(2006) 
Additional deaths representative 
of all heath impacts from climate 
change 
Coastal 
zones  
Percent population 
impacted by 1 m sea 
level rise 
Dasgupta et al 
(2007) 
Population at risk is a proxy of 
impacts on economies, assets 
and people 
 
To obtain an aggregate score, all values were normalized to ensure all sectors had 
roughly equal weight and no one indicator biased the results. Regional averages were 
calculated for those countries where no data was available. The results were averaged 
across all four criteria to give a final ‘impact vulnerability’ score per country. Figure 2 
and Table 2 summarize the result, grouping countries into impact quartiles. 
Methodology and detailed country scores are shown in Annex 1. 
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Figure 2    Country climate change impact rankings 
Note: The darkest red indicates the countries with the highest impact vulnerability score, light pink the 
lowest. Grey countries were omitted from the analysis. 
 
Table 2    Climate change impact rankings 
Quartile Countries 
I  
(highest impact) 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Rep., 
Congo Rep., Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Honduras, Egypt, Guyana, 
Suriname, Venezuela,  
II 
 
Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Dem. Rep., Comoros, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Namibia, Niger, 
Sao Tomé and Principe, South Africa, Tunisia, Zimbabwe, Antigua and 
Barbuda, Grenada, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, St Kitts and Nevis, St 
Lucia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Is., Samoa, Solomon Is., Tonga, Vanuatu, 
Ecuador 
III 
 
Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, 
Lao PDR, Maldives, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste, 
Belize, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Rep, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Moldova, Yemen, Micronesia, 
Papua New Guinea, Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru 
IV  
(lowest impact) 
Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, 
China, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Korea Rep., Kyrgyz Republic, Malaysia, 
Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, Albania, Romania, Serbia, Iran, Iraq, Jordon, Lebanon, 
Syria, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay 
Note: Data available for 131 countries. 
4. Indicators of adaptive capacity 
 
Besides physical impact, a country’s vulnerability crucially depends on its ability to 
adapt (Figure 1 above). Unlike impact, which is defined by the kind, extent and vigor 
of climatic variability, adaptive capacity is mainly determined by socio-economic 
factors, such as income, demographic trends, institutional capacity, political stability 
and the quality of education, water and health facilities. It is in fact these socio-
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economic dimensions that drive much of the vulnerability of developing nations. 
Adaptive capacity is therefore the second pillar of our indicator system. 
 
The adaptive capacity inherent in a system represents the assets available, and the 
ability to use these resources effectively in the pursuit of adaptation. In practical terms 
it is the ability to react to evolving hazards, which among other things requires the 
capacity to learn from previous experiences (Brooks and Adger 2004).  Other factors 
that determine adaptive capacity include the quality of institutions and decision 
making processes, the availability of resources and technologies and the stock of 
human and social capital (Tol and Yohe 2007).  Brooks et al (2005) highlight the 
importance of factors such as literacy, governance and health (which had to be 
omitted here for data reasons). 
However, indicators for adaptive capacity are generally more difficult to identify than 
risk, as they are not directly measurable, and the way in which individual factors 
interact is difficult to ascertain. Table 3 lists the capacity measures used here.  
 
Table 3    Indicators of adaptive capacity 
Indicator Metric Source Assumptions 
Age 
dependency 
ratio 
Ratio of dependent 
population to working 
population (2006) 
World Bank 
(2007) 
The lower the age dependency 
ratio, the higher the adaptive 
capacity 
Domestic 
credit to 
private sector 
Domestic credit to 
private sector, as a 
percentage of GDP 
(1998-2996) 
World Bank 
(2007) 
The better access to credit, the 
higher the adaptive capacity 
Gini  Gini coefficient (latest 
available year)  
World Bank 
(2007) 
The lower the GINI coefficient 
the lower the inequality, the 
higher the adaptive capacity 
Governance WGI (World 
Governance Indicator) 
voice and 
accountability 
Kaufman et al 
(2008)  
The higher the WGI score, the 
lower the degree of in-country 
conflict and the higher the 
adaptive capacity 
Literacy Percent population, 
aged >15years, literate 
(1991-2005) 
World Bank 
(2007) 
The higher the literacy rate, the 
higher the adaptive capacity 
Primary 
completion 
rate (female) 
Percent female 
population completing 
primary education 
(1991-2006) 
World Bank 
(2007) 
The higher the female primary 
completion rate, the higher the 
adaptive capacity 
Note: The WGI is a composite index that ranks countries according to six criteria: Voice and 
accountability; political stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness; rule of law; and 
control of corruption. Gini coefficients were unavailable for 27 countries. In order not to lose these 
countries, adaptive capacity was calculated as an average of the remaining five indicators. 
 
Figure 3   Country adaptive capacity rankings  
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Note: The darkest red indicates the countries with the lowest adaptive capacity (associated with the 
highest vulnerability). Light pink denotes the countries with the highest adaptive capacity. Grey 
countries were omitted from the analysis. 
 
Table 4   Adaptive capacity rankings 
Quartile Countries 
I  
(lowest capacity) 
Angola, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Rep., 
Chad, Comoros, Congo Dem. Rep., Congo Rep., Cote d’Ivoire, 
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, 
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Afghanistan, 
Haiti, Yemen 
II 
 
Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, 
Madagascar, Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria, Sao Tomé and Principe, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Lao PDR, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Iraq, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Is., Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Paraguay 
III 
 
Cape Verde, Seychelles, Tunisia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, India, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Philippines, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Belize, Dominican 
Rep., El Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Syria, Fiji, Kiribati, Micronesia, Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu, Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Suriname, Venezuela  
IV  
(highest capacity) 
Mauritius, South Africa, China, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Korea Rep., 
Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam, Antigua 
and Barbuda, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Panama, St Kitts 
and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Moldova, Romania, Serbia, 
Jordan, Marshall Is., Chile, Guyana, Uruguay 
Note: Data available for 131 countries.  
 
 
 
5. Indicators of implementation capacity 
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Decisions about adaptation spending may also be influenced by the ability of potential 
recipients to use funds effectively.  Like development aid, adaptation finance will be 
more cost-effective when targeted at countries that are able to implement the required 
strategies, for example, those with relatively sound or improving policies and 
institutions (Kaufmann and Kraay 2004).  
 
This is called a country’s implementation capacity and forms the third pillar of our 
indicator system. Implementation capacity introduces adaptation effectiveness as an 
explicit concern into the decision making process. It complements vulnerability, 
which combines both equity and efficiency considerations, in the sense that allocating 
money according to vulnerability is both fair and targets the areas of highest need. 
 
A number of performance indicators exist that can be used to address this country-
specific risk factor. They include Country Performance and Institutional Assessments 
(CPIA), the worldwide governance indicators (WGI), the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG), the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), the Global Competitive Index 
(GCI), as well as the country assessments of credit rating agencies. They each assess 
different aspects of government performance – including fiscal management, 
institutional quality, the business environment, corruption and credit default risks – 
but each aspect contributes to, or is correlated with, the ability of governments to 
manage financial inflows effectively.  
 
Note also that many of these indicators are correlated with adaptive capacity, the 
second pillar of our indicator framework. The WGI index, in particular, was used in 
Table 3 to assess institutional quality – a key factor of adaptive capacity. This creates 
a certain amount of double-counting. 
 
Our index of implementation capacity is based on CPIA, an index used by the World 
Bank Group to inform the allocation of concessional funding from the International 
Development Association (IDA). The CPIA ranks countries according to 16 
indicators grouped into four clusters as follows:  
 
 CPIA a: economic management; 
 CPIA b: structural policies;  
 CPIA c: policies for social inclusion and equity; and  
 CPIA d: governance (public sector management and institutions).  
 
Policies are ranked from one (low) to six (high) based upon a combination of 
objective data and expert judgment by World Bank staff. The final component of the 
index measures a country’s capacity to absorb finance. It is based on World Bank 
portfolio data from the Bank’s Annual Review of Portfolio Performance (ARPP).   
 
The five components were aggregated through the same formula the World Bank’s 
uses for IDA allocation, which gives additional weight to governance and public 
sector management. The implementation capacity index combines central government 
capacity and ability to absorb finance in the following way:   
 
 
Implementation = 0.24*average of (CPIAa  CPIAb  CPIAc) + 0.68*CPIAd + 0.08* ARPP 
Capacity 
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Figure 4 and Table 5 summarize the results by quartile, with the full results again 
given in Annex 1. Note that the sample size was reduced from 131 countries to 72 
countries. The CPIA is not calculated for all developing countries. 
 
Figure 4   Country implementation capacity rankings 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Note: The darkest red indicates the countries with the lowest implementation capacity (associated with 
the lower adaptation efficiency). Light pink denotes the countries with the highest implementation 
capacity. Grey countries were omitted from the analysis. 
 
Table 5    Implementation capacity rankings  
Quartile Countries 
I  
(lowest capacity) 
Angola, Burundi, Central African Rep., Chad, Comoros, Congo Dem 
Rep., Congo Rep., Cote d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, 
Nigeria, Togo, Zimbabwe, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Uzbekistan, Haiti 
II 
 
Cameroon, Djibouti, Gambia, Mauritania, Niger, Sao Tomé and 
Principe, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Bangladesh, Kyrgyz Republic, Nepal, 
Tajikistan, Yemen, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Is., Tonga, 
Vanuatu 
III 
 
Benin, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Mongolia, 
Pakistan, Dominica, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bolivia, Guyana 
IV  
(highest capacity) 
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde Is., Ghana, Senegal, Tanzania Uni. Rep., 
Armenia, Bhutan, Georgia, India, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, 
Grenada, Honduras, Nicaragua, St Lucia, St Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Samoa 
Note: Data available for 72 countries. 
 
It is worth re-emphasising that a low implementation capacity may not necessarily 
disqualify a country from receiving adaptation support. In fact, with their weak 
institutions and low adaptive capacity, fragile states are amongst the most vulnerable 
countries to climate change and as such most in need of support. However, 
insufficient implementation capacity may point to the need for different ways of 
providing support, with stricter monitoring arrangements and a stronger role for 
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development agencies in project management. It also points to a need for capacity 
building as an adaptation (and development) priority. 
 
6. An attempt at integration 
 
Sections 3 to 5 have developed quantitative indicators for the three pillars of our 
indicator framework: physical impact, adaptive capacity and implementation capacity.  
The next step is to combine the three constituent indicators into a ranking system that 
helps prioritizing access to adaptation finance. 
The degree to which the constituent indicators need to be aggregated for this purpose 
is open to debate. On the one hand, an aggregate score would have the advantage of 
simplicity. On the other hand, aggregation amplifies the uncertainties inherent in the 
constituent indicators. It also masks some important trade offs that perhaps ought to 
be made explicitly. We therefore start by analysing the constituent indicators 
separately.  
Fund allocation will initially require identification of the countries most affected by 
climate change. As we have seen (Figure 1), vulnerability is a function of physical 
impact and adaptive capacity. The interaction between the two drivers is potentially 
complex, but as a starting point Figure 5 plots the indicators for adaptive capacity (x 
axis) and physical impact (y-axis) against each other.  
 
Countries with high ‘impact vulnerability’ and low ‘adaptive capacity’ are located in 
the top left quartile. They are considered to be those most vulnerable and should 
therefore be at the forefront for fund allocation. Figure 5 shows that they are almost 
exclusively based within Africa. There are impact hotspots elsewhere, for example in 
Central and tropical South America, but adaptive capacity within many of the Central 
and South American countries is generally higher, which should reduce their long-
term vulnerability. The same pattern holds for small island states. They have high 
impact scores, but their adaptive capacity is also higher. 
 
To get a rough handle on the combined effect of impact vulnerability and adaptive 
capacity we merge the two scores into an indicator of overall vulnerability. The 
easiest way to do this is by subtracting the adaptive capacity score (where low 
capacity means high vulnerability) from the impact score (where high impact means 
high vulnerability).  
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Figure 5  Impact vulnerability (y axis) and adaptive capacity (x axis) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 and Table 6 show the results by quartile. A quick comparison between 
Figure 6 (overall vulnerability) with Figure 2 (physical impact) underlines the central 
importance of adaptive capacity. Their poor capacity to adapt leads to a 
disproportionately high vulnerability among African nations, suggesting in turn a 
strong concentration of adaptation effort on Africa.  
 
However, by their very nature, countries that are highly vulnerable to climate change 
may lack institutional capacity for implementing adaptation measures. Figure 7 
demonstrates this by plotting the overall vulnerability scores (Table 6) against 
implementation capacity (Table 5).  Implementation capacity is shown on the x axis, 
vulnerability on the y axis. 
 
At one level this suggests a trade-off between considerations of fairness – which 
would favor adaptation spending in the most vulnerability countries – and adaptation 
effectiveness, which suggests prioritizing slightly less vulnerable but more effectively 
governed countries.  However, in reality, the issue is less about fund allocation than 
implementation arrangements. Highly vulnerable countries should and will obtain the 
lion’s share of adaptation resources. However, their low implementation capacity may 
require adaptation agencies to take a more hands-on approach in project 
implementation than is generally assumed.  
 
Key:  Africa   Asia  Central America & Caribbean 
 Middle East Europe  South America 
Oceania       
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Figure 6   Overall vulnerability rankings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The darkest red indicates the highest overall vulnerability scores. Light pink denotes the lowest 
vulnerability scores. Grey countries were omitted from the analysis. 
 
Table 6    Overall vulnerability rankings 
Quartile Countries 
I  
(highest impact) 
Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Rep., Chad, Comoros, Congo, Congo Dem. Rep., Cote d’Ivoire, 
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia The, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Honduras, Suriname  
II 
 
Botswana, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, 
Madagascar, Namibia, Sao Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania Uni. Rep., Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, 
Lao PDR, Nepal, Pakistan, Vietnam, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, 
Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Is., Vanuatu, 
Ecuador, Guyana, Venezuela 
III 
 
Algeria, Cape Verde Is, Mauritius, Morocco, Tunisia, Bhutan, India, 
Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, Timor-Leste, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Belize, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Rep., El Salvador, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Panama, Iran Islamic Rep., Syrian Arab Rep., Fiji, Kirbati, 
Marshall Is., Micronesia Fed Sts., Samoa, Tonga, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Colombia, Paraguay, Peru 
IV  
(lowest impact) 
South Africa, Armenia, Azerbaijan, China, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Korea 
Rep, Kyrgyz Republic, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, 
Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Dominica, Grenada, St 
Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Moldova Rep, Romania, 
Serbia, Jordan, Lebanon, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay 
Note: Data available for 131 countries. 
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Figure 7    Overall vulnerability (y axis) and implementation capacity (x axis) 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
This paper proposes an analytical framework to inform the allocation of adaptation 
funding. An omniscient social planner would solve the problem by ranking all 
possible adaptation interventions in order of their benefit – cost ratio and financing 
them according to economic merit. Distributional issues would be accounted for 
explicitly, for example by using equity weighting (Fankhauser et al. 1997). Residual 
climate damages that cannot be adapted to cost-effectively  (Parry et al. 2009) would 
be subject to compensation, as appropriate. 
 
What we propose is a distant second best to the approach of the omniscient planner, 
but it may help to make allocation decisions more transparent, efficient and equitable.  
The approach is inspired by the World Bank’s method of allocating concessional IDA 
resources among the world’s poorest countries. It uses quantitative indicators to assess 
a country’s vulnerability, as well as its ability to manage additional resources 
effectively. 
Key:  Africa   Asia  Central America & Caribbean 
 Middle East Europe  South America 
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The IDA approach is not without its critics. Kanbur (2005) has argued that since the 
formula is uniform across countries, the IDA approach essentially imposes the same 
development model on all countries. This is problematic already for standard 
development issues, and may be even more so for climate change, where much less is 
known about the right adaptation model.   
 
Nevertheless, an empirical approach to allocating adaptation finance that aims to 
address these concerns could serve at least three purposes: it can reduce transaction 
costs if lobbying and negotiations (though inevitable) become a less prominent part of 
the allocation process, it can support the results agenda with an allocation process 
based on empirical measures, and it can support mutual accountability through 
transparency in allocations. 
 
Moreover, we do not propose that allocation decisions are made mechanistically 
according to a formula. The indicators are there to aid decision making, to make it 
more transparent and objective. But ultimately wise spending decisions will always 
take into account a range of considerations and require a considerable amount of 
judgement.  
 
Some of that judgement already enters into the indicator system. There are infinite 
ways in which the raw data on climate impacts, adaptive capacity and implementation 
capacity can be combined, scaled, normalized and added up.  The choice of data sets 
and the disparity between the underlying distributions of the chosen indicators will 
inevitable have implications for the implicit weighting of each. The way we 
constructed our indicators is only one of many ways how this might be done. Criteria 
weighting will ultimately be a political decision, made by experts in consultation with 
stakeholders. 
 
The quality of the indicators is also affected by data gaps and imperfect information.  
With limited knowledge of environment-system feedbacks and limited climate 
scenario projections, uncertainty is compounded at each step. Assessing country-level 
vulnerability requires aggregating impacts across a number of sectors, and 
uncertainties, scientific and modelled, are further escalated.  
 
There is substantial scope to improve the method over time. New data series may be 
added, for example, on physical impacts, where many potentially severe impacts have 
been omitted (for example, water, the implications of ocean acidification) or are 
represented only through proxies (for example, extreme events). Over time we may 
also learn more about the way the different determinants of adaptive capacity interact, 
a strand of research initiated by Tol and Yohe (2007). Our static approach may be 
made more dynamic by recognizing feedback loops and the fact that interventions will 
reduce future vulnerability.  
 
A key question that our indicator framework cannot answer is the magnitude of 
adaptation funding that will be required. Answering this question requires information 
about physical impacts and adaptation needs in absolute dollar terms, rather than the 
relative ranking of countries put forward in this paper. Information about this question 
is still sketchy, but it is clear that the adaptation bill will run into tens of billions of 
 19 
dollars.  This makes it all the more important that available funds are allocated as 
transparently, efficiently and equitably as possible. 
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Annex 1: Country-level results  
 
Individual indicators by country, as documented in Tables 1 and 3 and in the 
description of the CPIA in Section 5, are normalized by converting to z-scores, and 
then taking the average of these z-scores for each of the adaptive capacity, impact 
vulnerability, and implementation capacity indicators shown in the table below. We 
use an unweighted average, although the normalization procedure creates implicit 
weights. The overall vulnerability score is derived by subtracting adaptive capacity 
from impact vulnerability. 
 
Country indicators (ordered by overall vulnerability score) 
  
  Country Region 
Overall 
Vulnerability 
Adaptive 
Capacity 
Impact 
Vulnerability 
Implementation 
Capacity 
1 Guinea Bissau Africa 2.59 -1.20 1.39 -0.95 
2 Honduras 
Central America 
& Caribbean 1.72 -0.01 1.71 1.06 
3 Eritrea Africa 1.70 -1.61 0.09 -1.11 
4 
Central African 
Rep Africa 1.70 -1.34 0.36 -1.63 
5 Chad Africa 1.67 -1.57 0.10 -1.44 
6 Niger Africa 1.65 -1.32 0.33 -0.09 
7 Burkina Faso Africa 1.59 -1.00 0.59 0.83 
8 Mauritania Africa 1.51 -0.50 1.02 -0.54 
9 Mozambique Africa 1.48 -0.89 0.59 0.21 
10 Somalia Africa 1.45 -0.97 0.49   
11 Gambia The Africa 1.35 -0.77 0.58 -0.29 
12 Angola Africa 1.35 -1.11 0.24 -1.47 
13 
Zaire/Congo Dem 
Rep Africa 1.31 -1.26 0.06 -1.42 
14 Benin Africa 1.29 -0.49 0.80 0.51 
15 Guinea Africa 1.29 -0.93 0.36 -0.89 
16 Togo Africa 1.28 -0.88 0.40 -2.20 
17 Uganda Africa 1.28 -0.81 0.47 0.79 
18 Rwanda Africa 1.22 -0.85 0.37 0.55 
19 Zimbabwe Africa 1.11 -0.81 0.30 -2.78 
20 Sierra Leone Africa 1.10 -1.15 -0.04 -0.36 
21 Djibouti Africa 1.10 -0.77 0.33 -0.42 
22 Burundi Africa 1.09 -0.73 0.36 -0.75 
23 Malawi Africa 1.08 -0.58 0.50 0.31 
24 Congo Africa 1.02 -0.65 0.38 -0.74 
25 Cote d'Ivoire Africa 1.02 -0.92 0.11 -1.83 
26 Ethiopia Africa 0.98 -0.74 0.24 0.03 
27 Comoros Africa 0.96 -0.70 0.26 -1.54 
28 Senegal Africa 0.95 -0.59 0.36 0.99 
29 Nigeria Africa 0.94 -0.45 0.50 -0.68 
30 Mali Africa 0.94 -0.90 0.03 0.80 
31 Suriname South America 0.93 0.53 1.46   
32 Zambia Africa 0.92 -0.52 0.39 -0.05 
33 Cameroon Africa 0.89 -0.65 0.25 -0.11 
34 Liberia Africa 0.88 -0.88 0.00   
35 Swaziland Africa 0.85 -0.38 0.47   
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  Country Region 
Overall 
Vulnerability 
Adaptive 
Capacity 
Impact 
Vulnerability 
Implementation 
Capacity 
36 Lesotho Africa 0.80 -0.34 0.46 0.53 
37 Gabon Africa 0.79 -0.42 0.37   
38 Tanzania Uni Rep Africa 0.79 -0.29 0.49 1.29 
39 Venezuela South America 0.75 0.20 0.95   
40 Egypt Middle East 0.70 0.28 0.98   
41 Sudan Africa 0.69 -1.01 -0.33   
42 Haiti 
Central America 
& Caribbean 0.57 -0.69 -0.12 -1.39 
43 Yemen Middle East 0.53 -0.70 -0.17 -0.11 
44 
Papua New 
Guinea Oceania 0.50 -0.50 0.00 -0.66 
45 Madagascar Africa 0.48 -0.48 0.00 0.43 
46 Bangladesh Asia 0.44 -0.01 0.42 -0.11 
47 Kenya Africa 0.41 0.00 0.41 0.43 
48 Ghana Africa 0.35 -0.10 0.24 1.10 
49 Afghanistan Asia 0.31 -0.74 -0.42   
50 Lao P Dem Rep Asia 0.30 -0.40 -0.10 -0.77 
51 Namibia Africa 0.28 -0.08 0.20   
52 Guatemala 
Central America 
& Caribbean 0.28 -0.46 -0.18   
53 Viet Nam Asia 0.27 0.95 1.22 1.03 
54 Nicaragua 
Central America 
& Caribbean 0.25 0.08 0.32 0.85 
55 Botswana Africa 0.24 0.06 0.30   
56 Solomon Is Oceania 0.16 0.02 0.18 -0.47 
57 Ecuador South America 0.10 0.16 0.26   
58 Seychelles Africa 0.08 0.25 0.33   
59 Pakistan Asia 0.07 -0.27 -0.20 0.26 
60 Guyana South America 0.07 0.65 0.72 0.10 
61 Cambodia Asia 0.07 -0.11 -0.04 -0.88 
62 Vanuatu Oceania 0.04 0.28 0.32 -0.63 
63 Iraq Middle East 0.00 -0.37 -0.37   
64 Nepal Asia -0.04 -0.40 -0.44 -0.29 
65 
Sao Tome and 
Principe Africa -0.06 0.09 0.03 -0.12 
66 
Libyan Arab 
Jamah Africa -0.06 -0.02 -0.07   
67 East Timor Asia -0.06 -0.22 -0.28   
68 Cape Verde Is Africa -0.13 0.53 0.39 1.18 
69 Peru South America -0.19 0.20 0.01   
70 Fiji Oceania -0.21 0.34 0.13   
71 Paraguay South America -0.21 -0.05 -0.26   
72 
Micronesia Fed 
States Oceania -0.21 0.20 -0.01   
73 El Salvador 
Central America 
& Caribbean -0.26 0.17 -0.10   
74 Mexico 
Central America 
& Caribbean -0.30 0.37 0.07   
75 Dominican Rep 
Central America 
& Caribbean -0.31 0.19 -0.12   
76 Samoa Oceania -0.32 0.57 0.25 1.87 
77 Colombia South America -0.34 0.23 -0.11   
78 Belize 
Central America 
& Caribbean -0.36 0.37 0.01   
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Vulnerability 
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79 Kiribati Oceania -0.36 0.52 0.16 -0.37 
80 Jamaica 
Central America 
& Caribbean -0.38 0.28 -0.10   
81 Tunisia Africa -0.40 0.46 0.06   
82 Bolivia South America -0.42 0.04 -0.38 0.50 
83 Philippines Asia -0.43 0.32 -0.11   
84 Panama 
Central America 
& Caribbean -0.49 0.68 0.19   
85 Algeria Africa -0.50 0.09 -0.41   
86 Tonga Oceania -0.50 0.56 0.06 -0.61 
87 Marshall Is Oceania -0.52 0.62 0.10   
88 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Central America 
& Caribbean -0.52 0.61 0.09   
89 Morocco Africa -0.55 0.17 -0.38   
90 Myanmar Asia -0.57 0.01 -0.56   
91 India Asia -0.61 0.36 -0.24 0.96 
92 Brazil South America -0.68 0.43 -0.25   
93 Cuba 
Central America 
& Caribbean -0.71 0.59 -0.12   
94 Bhutan Asia -0.72 0.00 -0.72 1.55 
95 Syrian Arab Rep Middle East -0.73 0.20 -0.52   
96 Mauritius Africa -0.73 1.07 0.34   
97 Iran Islam Rep Middle East -0.73 0.30 -0.44   
98 Costa Rica 
Central America 
& Caribbean -0.76 0.61 -0.15   
99 Indonesia Asia -0.80 0.60 -0.20 0.26 
100 St Lucia 
Central America 
& Caribbean -0.83 0.93 0.10 1.55 
101 Georgia Asia -0.84 0.36 -0.48 1.17 
102 Maldives Asia -0.86 0.64 -0.22 1.05 
103 South Africa Africa -0.88 1.10 0.22   
104 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Central America 
& Caribbean -0.91 0.86 -0.05   
105 Grenada 
Central America 
& Caribbean -0.93 0.96 0.03 0.91 
106 Sri Lanka Asia -0.95 0.60 -0.36 0.83 
107 Turkmenistan Asia -0.96 0.01 -0.95   
108 
St Vincent and 
The Grenadines 
Central America 
& Caribbean -1.02 1.03 0.01 1.20 
109 Moldova Rep Europe -1.03 0.72 -0.30   
110 St Kitts and Nevis 
Central America 
& Caribbean -1.04 1.13 0.09   
111 Lebanon Middle East -1.04 0.50 -0.54   
112 Malaysia Asia -1.09 0.73 -0.36   
113 Dominica 
Central America 
& Caribbean -1.13 1.03 -0.10 0.43 
114 Argentina South America -1.13 0.33 -0.80   
115 Thailand Asia -1.17 0.86 -0.31   
116 Uzbekistan Asia -1.19 0.17 -1.01 -1.46 
117 Tajikistan Asia -1.23 0.22 -1.01 -0.42 
118 Jordan Middle East -1.25 0.74 -0.52   
119 
Bosnia-
Hercegovenia Europe -1.27 1.03 -0.24 0.34 
120 Romania Europe -1.36 0.93 -0.43   
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121 Kyrgyzstan Asia -1.40 0.51 -0.90 -0.22 
122 Chile South America -1.41 0.86 -0.55   
123 Armenia Asia -1.50 0.50 -1.01 2.06 
124 Kazakhstan Asia -1.56 0.69 -0.86   
125 Azerbaijan Asia -1.57 0.35 -1.22 0.64 
126 
Serbia 
Montenegro Europe -1.60 0.67 -0.93   
127 China P Rep Asia -1.62 0.72 -0.90   
128 Uruguay South America -1.62 0.62 -1.01   
129 Korea Rep Asia -1.72 0.82 -0.90   
130 Albania Europe -1.76 0.71 -1.04 0.57 
131 Mongolia Asia -2.28 0.84 -1.44 0.63 
 
 
 
 
 
